126
THOMAS FAUCHER
Fr. de Callatay 1997b, Quelques estimations relatives au nombre de monnaies grecques •
les collections publiques etprivies, le commerce et les trisors, RBN, 143,21-94.
Fr. de Callatay 1999, Etude de technique monetaire : le rapport « nombre de coins de
revers/nombre coins de droit » a I'ipoque hellenistique, Revue des Archeolosues et
Histonens d'Art de Louvain, 32,91-102.
Fr. de Callatay 2003, Recueil quantitatif des emissions monetaires archaiques et classiaues
Wetteren.
Fr. de Callatay 2007, L'historique des etudes des liaisons de coins (XVIIIe-XXe siecle)
BSFN, 86-92. h
Fr. de Callatay, G. Depeyrot and L. Villaronga 1993, L'argent monnaye d'Alexandre a
Auguste (Travaux du Cercle d'etudes numismatiques 12), Bruxelles.
G. F. Carter 1983, A simplified method for calculating the original number of dies from
die link statistics, ANSMN, 28,195-206.
W. W. Esty 1984, Estimating the size of a coinage, NC, 144,180-183
W. Esty 1986, Estimation of the size of a coinage: a survey and comparison of methods
NC, 146,185-215.
Th. Faucher et al. 2009, A la recherche des ateliers monitaires grecs : I'apport de
1'experimentation, RN, 165,43-80.
M. Gozalbes et P. P. Ripolles 2002, La fabricacion de moneda en la antiguedad, dans
Fabricacwn de la moneda y sus problemas. Actas. XI Congreso Nacional de
Numismdtica. 16 a 19 de octubre 2002, Zaragoza, 11-33.
O. Picard 1979, Chalcis et la confediration eubeenne. Etude de numismatique et d'histoire
(IVe-Ier siecle), Paris.
Peter G. van Alfen
HATCHING OWLS: ATHENIAN PUBLIC FINANCE
AND THE REGULATION OF COIN PRODUCTION
1. Introduction*
Between roughly 460 and 404 BC, the Athenians produced a massive quantity of
coins, mostly in the form of large denomination tetradrachm "owls."' Because of the
colossal flood of coinage produced by the Athenians, and because of their political and
economic hegemony, the owl became the nomisma koinon of their Aegean arche as
other coinages were overwhelmed and drowned out.2 The vast number of surviving
late fifth century owls - perhaps tens of thousands - and their unforgiving monotony
has discouraged numismatists so far from undertaking the die study necessary to help
gain insight into the rhythms of production, closer dating for the subtypes, and the
numbers produced.3 Although we will probably wait many years still for this study,
we can nevertheless avail ourselves of other historical, social, and fiscal documentation
from imperial Athens to lay the ground work for the types of questions that such a
comprehensive study would seek to answer. This paper investigates two such
interrelated issues: 1) whether the Athenians had reason to exercise administrative
* 1 thank Wolfang Fischer-Bossert, Emily Mackil, Andrew Meadows, Ute Wartenberg Kagan, and
Miiserref Yetim for their comments on earlier drafts, and John Kroll particularly for many profitable
discussions on the topics herein. None, of course, can be faulted for any shortcomings.
1 For the dating and economic significance of this mass striking see Flament 2007b 54-59 and
Kroll 1993, 5-7. In his forthcoming publication on the Malayer hoard (IGCH 1790), Andrew
Meadows presents a die study of the owls in the hoard, which date to the period between roughly 460
and 440 BC. Based on his calculations and statistical models, Meadows estimates that during this
period alone the Athenians were minting between 733 talents (1 million coins) and 6053 talents (9
million coins) per annum.
2 For a detailed analysis of the process by which other Aegean mints ceased production while the
Athenians stepped up production of owls, see Figueira 1998, part I.
3 Flament's (2007b, 59-120) typology of later fifth-century issues, while useful, lacks the
comprehensive rigor of a die study necessary for addressing these sorts of questions.
128
PETER G. VAN ALFEN
control over coinage output, including the quantity of coinage they produced; and 2)
the extent and type of control over silver inputs to the mint, particularly those derived
from the Laureion mines.
It has long been recognized that the Athenians' ability to sustain a high level of coin
production in the later fifth century was due in part to the confluence of two mighty
silver revenue streams: that coming from the indigenous mines at Laureion, and that
from phoros (tribute) paid by Athens' subject allies. Additional, and indeed perhaps
equally important streams flowed into Athenian coffers from a wide variety of taxes,
leases, fines, booty, indemnities and the like assessed and collected both internally
within Attika and externally within the arche. We are, however, not well enough
informed to gauge the size of these streams relative to one another or to determine their
proportional contribution to the production of late fifth century Athenian coinage.
There is, however, little doubt that significant amounts of Laureion silver went to the
mint,4 and this indigenous supply of silver set the Athenians apart from their peer
polities: they were not compelled to enter the market, conclude bi- or multi-lateral
agreements, or undertake belligerent action to obtain metal for their coinage as nearly
all other poleis must have done. 5 Having comparatively unfettered access to silver
was a major factor in the Athenians' ability to produce large amounts of coinage.
Although we can largely reconstruct the administrative structure of Athenian public
and imperial finance in the later fifth century, its revenues and expenditures, plus the
political and social structure that predicated it all, there are areas where we are at best
barely informed, particularly concerning the problems this paper seeks to investigate
on the relationship of the mint to the fiscal system, the location, operation, and
administration of the mint per se, and on the mechanisms of mint inputs and outputs.
Much of what follows, therefore, is necessarily speculative. Despite the paucity of
evidence, these issues are worth investigating since the flow of money, mostly in the
form of owls, through the public finance system and the Athenian economy at large
played a significant role in the Athenians' ability to maintain their arche, their opulent
festivals and public works, their extensive trade networks, and their prolonged war
with Peloponnesian powers. I begin approaching these problems by looking at how
the Athenians managed their public funds and the role that the mint may have played
in their public finance system. By mapping the system and the flow of silver (both
coined and uncoined) into, through, and out of it, and by attempting to situate the mint
4 Metallurgical studies indicate that Laureion silver was increasingly used to produce Athenian
coinage from the late sixth century onward; see Nicolet-Pierre 1983, 1985; Flament 2007c.
5 The mechanisms by which coin-producing poleis obtained silver that was not produced
indigenously, and this of course would include nearly all of them, is little understood for lack of
evidence. Certainly some foreign coinage was used in the production of new coinage as overstrikes
show (cf. Le Rider 1975), but we cannot say for certain whether this coinage, or any raw bullion, was
obtained through trade, war, cooperative arrangements, or purchase.
HATCHING OWLS: ATHENIAN PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE REGULATION OF COIN PRODUCTION 129
within the system, we can develop a sense of the system's character and its likeliest
response to monetary needs, including the minting of new coinage.
2. Outputs: Coinage and Public Finance
We are woefully under-informed about the specific reasons why most ancient
states, including Athens, produced coinage at any particular time. Profit-making,
public obligations (especially that generated by military action), trade, politics,
and prestige, either singularly or combined, have all been proposed as motivations
for ancient coin production.6 We should not assume, however, that whatever the
motivation there was necessarily a direct correlation between the production of
coinage and a polis' public finance system, that system of taxation, treasurization,
and spending of public funds. A polis may have chosen, like many did, to conduct
all or a portion of its public finance in currencies not its own, in bullion, or in kind
instead of coinage.7 David Schaps (2004) has argued that, by the late fifth century,
Athens was one of the more highly monetized poleis in the Aegean, paying large
and small public obligations in its own currency, while simultaneously producing
a high volume of coinage in a range of denominations. It is, therefore, safe to
assume that mint operations were to some degree embedded within the public
finance system and many of the coins produced were used directly in the payment
of public obligations. This section explores this degree of embeddedness.
The relationship between coin production and public finance under the
Peisistratids and the early democracy is little understood.8 We can assume that
both were reasonably well integrated, and remained so once both came ultimately
under the sway of the demos.9 Also embedded within the public finance system
were the sacral treasuries, the storehouses of pious dedications, which frequently
6 Howgego (1990) offer the most comprehensive overview for the many reasons why ancient
states struck coins. Kroil (forthcoming) argues that the p/-style owls were introduced c. 350 BC as
an attempt by the Athenian state to profit from the (re)minting of private silver holdings.
7 As Figueira (1998, part I) demonstrates, the reduced number of cities producing coinage in the
later fifth century means that many had to have adopted the coinage of other cities, like that of Athens,
in order to conduct public business including in some cases phoros payments to Athens.
8 "Public finance" throughout this paper is understood to include the financial operations of
temples and other sanctuaries. As Samons 2000 repeatedly stresses, the distinction between sacral and
non-sacral reserves, while quite real in terms of their administration and handling of funds,
nevertheless were seen as functioning within the same system and were equally available for paying
expenditures of any type.
9 A role for individual Athenian elites in the production of the various pre-owl series of
Wappenmiinzen is suggested by the changing types of the obverses; see Kroll 1981, 7. By the time
the production of owls was in full swing in the late 500s, fueled by the discovery of rich new veins
of silver at Laureion, overall control of coin production likely shifted fully to the demos.
130
PETER G. VAN ALFEN
served banking and lending roles. With the creation of the Delian League in the
470s, another layer of financial institutions was gradually added, so that by the
time of the transfer of the League's treasure to Athens around 454, the demos was
managing institutions that dealt with finance in both the domestic (public) and
imperial realms, and in the sacral and non-sacral realms, often with considerable
crossover between them all. It is only on the eve of the Peloponnesian War that we
begin to have sufficient evidence to outline, albeit roughly, the public and imperial
finance system. But even so, we are left with more questions than answers. Major
issues concerning the number and the functions of the various Athenian treasuries,
for example, remain as unresolved as specific questions pertaining to the mint and
coin production; therefore any reconstruction of the system is subject to serious
criticism and endless revision.10
The Structure of Athenian Public Finance
Since this is not the place to engage in these larger arguments concerning the
details of Athenian public finance, I have adopted the system proposed by Loren
Samons (2000), whose study of Athenian imperial finance, and by extension public
finance, offers the most recent comprehensive reconstruction. For our puiposes, the
major points of Samons' reconstruction, which may differ from those of others,
are as follows:
1) Perhaps as early as the late sixth century (cf. IG I3 1), if not in fact earlier, a
public treasury, the demosion under the direct control of the Kolakretai, was
created. By the time of the Peloponnesian War, if not earlier, this treasury received
revenue from domestic taxes, fines, rents, leases, and, most importantly, revenue
from the mines at Laureion. The demosion covered the costs of running the
government, i.e., public salaries, including pay for juries, and perhaps paid for the
construction of new triremes (Samons 2000,55-69).
2) The treasury of the Hellenotamiai, created in the 470s to manage the Delian
League funds, remained the primary repository of the phoros after the transfer of
the League treasury to Athens. Like the demosion, this treasury was probably not
located on the acropolis. The Hellenotamiai (frequently?) transferred funds to the
treasury of Athena, and the Other Gods, and are found accompanying Strategoi on
10 The bibliography of Athenian imperial and public finance is vast. The most recent and thorough
treatment of the system is that of Samons 2000; Blamire 2001 provides a short, useful summary of
the system, which differs in significant ways from that of Samons. Figueira's (1998) study also
provides important recent treatments of various aspects of the system, as does Kallet-Marx 1999,
Kallet2001 and Mattingly 1996.
HATCHING OWLS: ATHENIAN PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE REGULATION OF COIN PRODUCTION \ 3 J
campaign, presumably as paymasters to cover campaign costs from their funds
(Samons 2000,70-83).
3) Perhaps the oldest and most important treasury in Athens, that of the patron
deity Athena, was housed on the acropolis. In addition to the usual fines, rents, and
donations accrued by sanctuaries in general, this fund also received the aparchai
(l/60lh) of the phoros, and occasional fund transfers from the Hellenotamiai (cf. IG
I3 52A, B) and other sanctuaries. At the onset of the Peloponnesian War, this
treasury probably held the greatest reserve of coinage in Athens (cf. Thuc. 2.13.3-
5). Money from this treasury was directly paid out by the Tamiai for the upkeep of
the sanctuary, which included, from 447 on, the construction of the Parthenon and
other major buildings. Loans at roughly 7% interest were also given out, most
notably to the Athenian state, which used the borrowed funds to finance military
operations (Samons 2000, 30-50).
4) The creation of the treasury of the Other Gods on the eve of the Archidamian
War (cf. IG I3 52A) was not an act of consolidating miscellaneous sacral treasuries
into one place, but rather a means of paying back loans to outlying sanctuaries
while keeping those returned funds in a single safe location on the acropolis.
Outlying sanctuaries like that of Nemesis at Rhamnous and Artemis at Brauron,
continued to maintain their individual treasuries on site, along with their lending
and revenue operations (Samons 2000,50-54).
The structure of the Athenian public and imperial finance system was constantly
evolving, with new parts added or subtracted continually; after 411, for example,
the duties of the Kolakretai were subsumed by the Hellenotamiai and the funds
under the two sets of magistrates presumably merged (Samons 2000, 260). The
map (Fig. 1) presented here must therefore be taken as a snap shot of the system
as it more or less appeared during the Archidamian War, a period when the
Athenians were still reasonably flush with cash and the mines at Laureion still
accessible and operating. Included in this picture are the Apodektai, although it is
not certain if these officials were part of the system at this time (Fig. 1)."
Money owed the Athenian state was collected by the receiving officers, the
Apodektai, on a regular basis from domestic sources like tax farmers and renters,
and imperial sources, like tributary allies.12 Once a reckoning of these moneys had
been made in the presence of the Boule, and the necessary "paper work" completed,
1' Androtion (FGH 324 F 5) claims that the Apodektai were established under Kleisthenes; Pollux
8.97 states that the Apodektai are the receivers of tribute, eisphora, and other taxes; the first clear
epigraphic mention is in IG F 84, lines 15-18, an inscription from 418/17; see Samons 2000, 183,
n.69.
12 In the fourth century, the tax farmer of the 2% deposited his collections every prytany ([Dem.]
50.27). AP 47.3 refers to the requirements of tax farmers to pay their installments every prytany,
three times a year, or once a year. Tribute was paid annually.
132
PETER G. VAN ALFEN
E
HATCHING OWLS: ATHENIAN PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE REGULATION OF COIN PRODUCTION J 33
the funds were transferred to the appropriate treasury, e.g., phoros to the
Hellenotamiai, domestic taxes to the demosion, and so on.13 Each treasury had
certain types of expenditures that it might normally cover. Domestic governmental
expenses, like pay for juries, would come out of the demosion; the expenses of the
acropolis building program out of the treasury of Athena, and so forth. But while
this division of responsibilities might be the general rule, the system was in fact
quite flexible; preferences for using one treasury over another might change for
certain expenditures; sacral expenditures might be drawn from the demosion; non-
sacral from the sanctuary treasuries.14 Transfers between the many treasuries
occurred on occasion, although it would appear that most such transfers took place
between the various sacral treasuries, and the Hellenotamiai and the sacral
treasuries, with the demosion perhaps left out of the loop.15 On analogy with fourth
century practice (Rhodes 1972, 99), the Kolakretai probably paid out requested
funds from the demosion to other elected (or selected) officials who would then
distribute them to juries and the like. Sacral treasuries may not have used
intermediaries to pay out expenditures related to sanctuary upkeep, but loans to
the state for military campaigns were, especially after 411, channeled to the
Strategoi through the Hellenotamiai (Samons 2000, 77, 261). Thus, through
payments of various types, coins from the many treasuries entered both the internal
private economy and the extra-polis economy of the arche, where some proportion
would again be recaptured as taxes, rents, phoros, etc. and would reenter the
system.
As with other Athenian magistrates, the various treasury officials underwent
vetting and accounting procedures at the beginning and end of their terms in order
to discourage embezzlement and encourage fiscal responsibility.16 In general the
Athenians sought to construct a public and imperial finance system that was deeply
rule oriented, transparent, and exacting in its details, but necessarily flexible in
fulfilling its general mission. Some inherent flexibility was essential for it to work
because of its ever increasing scope and revenues, and its many, ill-fitting sacral
and non-sacral component parts. This flexibility also included an ability to adapt
fairly rapidly to changes within the wider economic world through minor
13 Rhodes 1972,98-99; IG P 84 (lines 15-18) shows the Apodektai transferring fund to the treasury
of the Other Gods.
14 Samons (2000, 285) argues, for example, that after the Archidamian War, the Athenians
significantly reduced their use of the treasury of Athena and the Other Gods for military expenses.
On crossovers between sacral and non-sacral use, see Samons 2000,64, 69.
15 There are no records of transfers between the demosion and the sacral treasuries, but the silence
does not prove that these transfers did not take place. The evidence for transfers between the
Hellenotamiai and sacral treasuries (e.g., IG P 52A, B) and among the sacral treasuries themselves
(e.g., IG P 386) is more forthcoming.
16 AP 54.2; cf. Samons 2000, 314.
134
PETER G. VAN ALFEN
adjustments of the rules or major overhauls of the system as took place continually
throughout the fifth and fourth centuries.
Administration and the Projection of Monetary Needs
At the top of the administrative hierarchy of this system was the Boule, which,
as Rhodes argues (1972,89), was not only «regarded as generally responsible for
the financial well-being of Athens», but also:
watched over the activities of the sacred treasurers, the poletae, and the [apodektai];
in the fifth century it controlled the [kolakretai], and in the fourth it appointed a
board of logistae...to examine in each prytany the accounts of those who received
an allocation of public money for their expenses. Each of these officials or boards
was involved only at one point in the state's finances; the boule was involved at
every point, and it alone could see the whole picture. (Rhodes 1972, 104-5)
Armed with this aggregation and alignment of financial information, the Boule
could decide how best to organize fund transfers between the treasuries, and
otherwise arrange to channel moneys that were needed. But because general
authority for financial matters rested with the Ekklesia,17 in most cases permission
would have to be sought from the Ekklesia to enact the Boule's recommendations.
Besides internal fund transfers, the Boule's recommendations may also have
included new taxes or tax rates and changes in coin production. Towards the end
of the fifth century, if not before, it was the Ekklesia that voted on the minting of
any new series of coins, and the demonetization of old series.18 Authority to
introduce new denominations and to change the types must also have rested
ultimately with this body.
Because the Boule "could see the whole picture", it alone was in a position to
identify annually recurring expenses, to gauge past rates of revenues and
expenditures, and to set those figures alongside current reserves and expected
income. It would not be a major step then for the Boule to engage in some form of
planning and budgeting for future expenditures. That the Athenians in the fifth
century routinely budgeted for future expenditures can be seen in the tribute
reassessment decree of Thoudippos (IG I3 71, Ins. 45-48), wherein the Strategoi are
requested to estimate their expenses for the coming year for the Boule, and also in
abonSn^h?Fttf6Crehe (h/gk 61),,3S Sam°nS (20°°'64) n0tes>Provides a clear '"dication that by
noHaSallke aUth°rity °VBr the Stat6'S financial 0T°°™S> sacral ™«
cf. tn\VmiECCL 815"22); EkWeSia PaSS apsepMsma ^hc^ing * new bronze coinage;
HATCHING OWLS: ATHENIAN PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE REGULATION OF COIN PRODUCTION ] 35
Thucydides 7.28.19 Any budgeting considerations by the Boule revolved around the
amount of "old" coinage and bullion on hand in the treasuries and projections of
income from, for example, the farming of taxes, the revenues of which would be
drawn from the stock of coinage already in circulation. What cannot be known is
the proportion of the budgeting calculated in bullion transfers (e.g., for internal
accounting purposes or large payments of external debts) and "new" coinage
produced from bullion stored in the treasuries (including foreign bullion and
coinage) and fresh Laureion silver.20
The Mint and Control over Output
The mint did nothing more than convert monetary metals from one form into
another. Early in the history of Athenian minting, if not at its inception, ownership
of this function became the state's, and the state's alone.21 Because the Athenians
decided to pay themselves and others with their own coinage, the relationship of
the mint to the public finance system was greatly enhanced by its being the sole
font of all (bona fide) Athenian coinage. The administration of the mint, like the
public finance system itself, must have evolved through the course of the sixth and
fifth centuries.
We know very little about the Athenian mint in the later fifth century. Epigraphic
and archaeological evidence show that the mint was a publicly owned and operated
industry located in the agora,22 that had a board of Epistatai in direct control of the
''' «...for their expenditures were not the same as before, but they were far greater, inasmuch as
the war too was greater; on the other hand, their revenues were perishing» (trans. Kallet). On this
passage Kallet (2001, 197 n. 54) notes: «Thucydides statement...is an important qualifier to the
standard assumption that the Greeks (and Romans) had no concept of a budget because they lacked
double-entry bookkeeping. Thucydides' comments clearly shows an awareness of income-
expenditure ratio and of future expenditures, not merely emergency measures for a present need.»
Fourth century evidence for budgeting is more forthcoming, cf. Faraguna 1992, 171-194.
20Cf./GIP 1443,1ns. 12-88 (cf.Harris 1995,123-127), which lists 140-plusstratioticfund "cake"
ingots (phthoicles) of silver, each weighing 12 minas (5196 g), stored in the Parthenon in 344/3 BC.
It is reasonable to assume that significant amounts of silver bullion, possibly from Laureion, were also
stored in and traded between the treasuries during the later fifth century; cf. Thuc. 2.13.4 (uncoined
gold and silver listed by Perikles as part of Athenian reserves); and Thuc. 6.8.1 (the Egestans
presenting 60 talents of bullion to the Athenians in 415 in order to lure them to Sicily, enough for 300
of the phthoicles noted above).
21 The manner by which early state authorities assumed the monopoly to coin, and their reasons for
doing so, may have included a desire to control any profit derived from the process, or to control the
ensuing coinage, which would include the right to call it back when desired. [Arist.] Oec. 1354al5-l 8
relates a Peisistratid coinage recall for the sake of profiting from the restriking of the old coinage.
22 That the Athenian mint was located in the agora has been, at least partially, confirmed by recent
archaeological discoveries there. Camp and Kroll (2001) have identified a structure in the agora that
appears to have been a mint, but for bronze, not silver coinage, making it possible that the mint for
silver coinage in or near the agora has yet to be discovered (cf. Camp & Kroll 2001, 144-145). The
arguments for a mint located closer to the Laureion mines (e.g. Flament 2007a, 8) are highly speculative.
136
PETER G. VAN ALFEN
operations, who, on analogy with other officers in the public finance system, e.g., the
Treasurers of Athena (cf. AP 47.1), presumably served for fixed terms and were
answerable to the Boule and the Ekklesia.23 From the administrative perspective, the
mint could not have been any different from the other components of the finance
system, like the demosion, and so was subject to the same intense accounting
procedures and vetting of its overseers.24 As a money factory in the most literal sense,
the mint also required skilled laborers, presumably public slaves;25 the number of
mint workers maintained by the mint is impossible to calculate, but it must have been
sizeable (e.g., a few dozen individuals) if the mint was producing millions of coins
every year (cf. n.2). We also cannot be certain of the source of the funds used for the
support of the slaves/workers and other incidental industrial costs, like tools. As we
learn from Nikophon's nomos of 375/4 (SEG 26.72), the Boule could direct other
departments (in this case the Apodektai) to provide support for public slaves employed
elsewhere in the system. If funds for the mint's operations were not provided by the
demosion vel sim., allowances were probably made to skim off some portion of the
silver flowing through the mint to cover expenses, as was often the case with pre-
modern mints.26 Day to day decisions about coin production, e.g., the schedule for
engraving new dies and replacing worn dies, must have been left to the Epistatai,
or more likely their (slave) foremen. Setting the basic parameters of the operation,
including the range of the denominations produced, the weight standard, the purity
of the metal, and the types, as well as any fees and accounting procedures, rested
ultimately with the Boule and Ekklesia (cf. Ar. Eccl. 815-22). Despite the
perception that these guidelines were rather static - as the ubiquitous, standardized
tetradrachms would imply - they clearly evolved over time with the addition and
subtraction of new denominations in silver, and later on, in bronze.27 The evolution
23 See/G I3 1453, section V and Figueria's (1998, ch. 13) commentary; d.Agora III, pp. 160-161:
SEG 21.667 (356/5 BC) also mentions the overseers of the mint (epistatai ton argyrokopeiou).
24 A late fifth-century cooperative coinage agreement between Mytilene and Phokaia (IG XII 2,
1) offers a sense of how seriously mint operators could be scrutinized: failure to mix the alloys
correctly was punishable by death.
25 We cannot know, given the lack of evidence, the status of the die engravers, although they too
could have been skilled slaves.
26 Brassage fees charged by the medieval mint in Venice, for example, were roughly 2% (Stahl 2000,
171). Section V of the Standards Decree (IG I3 1453) may indicate that the Athenian mint had a reserve
stock of silver that served, among other things, to cover expenses. See below for further discussion.
27 The range of denominations produced in Athens fluctuated throughout the fifth century. The
tetradrachm (c. 17.28 g), and possibly the drachm (c. 4.32 g) and obol (c. 0.72 g), appear to have been
in more or less continuous production; for a brief period around c. 460 BC decadrachms (c. 43.20 g) and
didrachms (c. 8.64 g) were produced. In the second half of the century the range of smaller denominations
in silver, fractions of obols and drachms down to the tiny tetartemorion (c. 0.18 g), was greatly expanded.
During the financial crisis at end of the Peloponnesian War, a series of gold coins in a variety of
denominations, and silver-plated bronze tetradrachms and drachms were minted. The beginning of
bronze fractional coinage is generally placed well into the fourth century, although some evidence
(discussed in Camp & Kroll 2001, 144-45) may suggest a start before 400 BC.
HATCHING OWLS: ATHENIAN PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE REGULATION OF COIN PRODUCTION 137
of these guidelines along the spectrum of monetary serviceability, i.e., creating a
variety of coin sizes to serve specific purposes, suggests that the Boule and Ekklesia
were responsive to changes in monetary demands, whether those they created for
themselves, or those brought on within the larger economic or social landscape.28
This responsiveness could be manifested both in the adaptation of the physical form
of coinage and in the regulation of the quantities of coinage produced. However, we
should bear in mind that the time scale between these two responses could be quite
different. Except in cases of extreme financial crisis, governments might tend to
expand or contract the range of denominations slowly following, in most cases,
larger, long-term economic trends; conversely, fluctuations in the quantities of each
denomination produced could be much more sudden, depending on bullion supplies,
short-term needs or budgetary concerns. Thus, while the Boule could provide
general standing guidelines for many mint operations that might remain unchanged
for years, e.g., the types, the denominational range, the alloy composition, etc., for
matters relating to the regulation of quantity long-term guidelines might have been
more difficult to establish, or at least more readily subject to change. In establishing
a policy for the production of coinage, the Boule (and Ekklesia) would have to
decide, among other things, what ultimate function(s) Athenian coinage served.
For example, whether the production of coinage was seen as a common good, like
defense, provided and administered by the state to facilitate economic life; or
whether the production of coinage was a means of raising revenue for the state; or
whether coinage was simply a tool used by the state to pay its debts without further
concern for its availability in local markets or in the purses of its overseas traders.
The Boule, of course, could choose to steer a course among all possibilities, seeking
to establish a general policy that was flexible and inclusive enough to fulfill a
greater rather than lesser range of functions. Some of these functions would require
greater oversight and direction than others, however. If, for example, the
availability of coinage, particularly small change, was seen as a common good,
the mint might require direction on how many of each denomination it should
produce within a given time period. Left to their own devices, it is questionable
whether many mints would choose to produce small change in precious metals,
like late-fifth century Athenian tetartemoria (0.18 g), because of the inherent
difficulties and costs of producing such miniscule coins compared to those in larger
denominations.29 It is questionable too whether the comparative volume of demand
28 Fischer-Bossert (2008a, 31) has recently suggested that social rather than economic pressures were
partially responsible for the end of decadrachm production because the "ideology of the radical
democracy" would have viewed such large denomination coins as a manifestation of oligarchical ideals.
29 By way of comparanda, the medieval Venetian mint avoided producing small change unless
compelled to do so because of the greater difficulties and costs compared to larger denominations (Stahl
2000,174); indeed, the Venetian state often had to subsidize small change production (Stahl 2000,101).
138
PETER G. VAN ALFEN
for tetartemoria versus that for tetradrachms would make up for any potential
losses incurred in production. Athens, and perhaps many other poleis, may have
had to subsidize small change production to some degree in order to provide it at
all.30 The significant production of (miniscule) small change in late-fifth century
Athens would then seem to speak to some level of output control, if not actual
quantity control by the public finance system, in so far as direct orders for small
change production may have been placed by the Boule, the Kolakretai, or other
treasurers. Once the Athenians decided to pay citizens for public service, such as
jury duty, it was in the state's interest, via the demosion, to keep a ready supply of
small change on hand - particularly (tri)obols - for payment at the end of daily
service. Orders for these coins may have been made at the beginning of each
prytany, or made on an ad hoc basis as supplies ran low.31
Similar mechanisms may have governed the production of the larger
tetradrachms, particularly when situated within the budgeting practices of the
public finance system. The Boule or Ekklesia (or the various treasurers32) may
have ordered new owls from the mint to meet current or estimated expenses that
could not be met by the coinage at hand. Section V of the Standards Decree (/G P
1453), discussed more fully below, may include an example of such an order. It is
likely that most such orders were ad hoc, as the Standard Decree's may have been,
demanding the minting of a specific quantity of bullion held in reserve at the mint
or other treasuries.
Ad hoc measures, however, would likely not account for the tremendous
numbers of owls produced in the later fifth century. Instead we should expect an
30 There must have been some recognition of the fact that it cost more, however this was calculated,
to produce 96 tetartemoria from 17.28 g of silver than it did to produce a single tetradrachm. Kagan's
(2006) suggestion of batch production of hemiobols at Abdera to explain the variation of weight in
the small coins (0.29-0.36 g) could be indicative of subsidization in so far as this method would
reduce costs for the mint that it could not otherwise easily pass on to consumers. Also, Fischer-
Bossert (2008b, 15) notes that, «[a] city producing coinage of all denominations can afford to take
the profit from the big ones and thus contribute to the small ones.»
31 Aristophanes {Wasps 662-63) indicates 150 talents per year were spent on jury pay, or 180,000
triobols per prytany (cf. Loomis 1998, 10). We have no idea of the size of triobol reserves or the
circulating pool of triobols that could be captured in taxes in 422, the year Wasps was first performed,
but assuming, for the sake of argument, that the reserve was 180,000 total at the beginning of the year,
even with a circulating loss rate of just 3% per annum (through loss, hoarding, or export), the
Kolakretai would still have to order over 500 new replacement triobols (or their equivalent) each
prytany after the first, or 4500 new triobols per year.
32 It is not clear how much leeway or personal discretion the various treasurers and other board
officials had over their respective funds beyond the Boule's oversight. Once handed an order to
transfer funds or to pay out, for example, were they left to decide on their own accord the details of
the transactions regarding currency type, denominations, or the desirability of sending stock to the
mint for coining? Kallias A (/G I3 52A, In. 4) would suggest that in some instances they were not: it
was "our coinage" {nomismatos hemedapo) i.e., Athenian issues not other types, that were ordered
brought to the treasury of Athena in a transfer from the HeUenotamiai.
HATCHING OWLS: ATHENIAN PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE REGULATION OF COIN PRODUCTION 139
additional policy (or policies) of production that acknowledged and accommodated
the healthy streams of fresh and old silver, privately and publicly held, flowing
into Athens from trade, taxes, tribute and the mines. These policies would not
necessarily have been concerned with governing the numbers of coins produced,
but rather monitoring silver inputs in order to derive the maximum benefit to the
polis and its citizens.33 We shall turn to these issues of input control momentarily.
In sum, the type of administrative control that the public finance system exercised
over coin production was not intended to be restrictive, as, for example, in an attempt
to curb price increases through a reduction of the quantity of money.34 Rather, the
system acted to encourage production as much as possible. In addition to the steady
output of coins determined by the input mechanisms we shall consider next, the system
likely spurred on the further production of coins, like some smaller denominations, to
fulfill its own immediate needs or obligations. Here the system would occasionally
seek to direct the quantity of coins produced, simply because some figure would have
to be passed onto the mint when new triobols were ordered, for example.
3. Inputs
The Athenians' (occasional) need to direct mint output was, as suggested above,
a function of providing coinage for public obligations and meeting budgetary
needs; the process of regulating silver inputs, on the other hand, was primarily a
function of generating revenue for the state. Where and how the Athenians
regulated silver inputs necessarily varied. If we consider the total amount of silver
coinage and bullion flowing into and through Athens in the course of trade, mining
activities, imperial rent seeking, and booty from warfare, a significant proportion
of this was captured by the public finance system. Where the silver entered the
system (e.g., at the mint or through the Apodektai) and through which mechanisms
(e.g., taxes or booty) has direct bearing on its form (e.g., as owls, foreign coins, or
bullion), its potential for (long term) storage in that form, and its potential for
immediate use in the production of fresh owls. There are two major problems that
this section explores: 1) whether non-Athenian silver that entered the system
through taxes and tribute would have been (immediately) converted to owls; and
2) the mechanisms by which Laureion silver was converted to owls. Free-minting,
that is a policy of open access to the mint for private holders of bullion, plays a key
role in both these discussions.
33 Christesen's (2003) picture of economic rationalization and maximizing at both the state and
individual level in fourth century Athens may reflect practices that began in the fifth century. (Cf.
Akrigg 2007, 36-39).
34 As Bresson (2005) demonstrates, there was an awareness in the classical period of the
140
PETER G. VAN ALFEN
Taxes and Tribute
We have no way of knowing what proportion of the money flowing through
Athens and the public finance system at any given time was in the form of owls.
Assuming it was generally high, we can imagine that there were fluctuations from
time to time even though the Athenians, like many Greek poleis, appear to have
strictly controlled the form of legal currency within their borders - at least on paper,
as it were.35 Because Athens was a major international entrepot, other currencies
flowed into the polis in the course of normal trade, but how well these other
currencies were quarantined is open to question. While it might be expected that
large denomination Kyzikene electrum (and Persian gold) coins would obtain
(official?) currency in Athens (cf. Lysias XII.11), in part because of their
tremendous value, lack of comparable Athenian denominations, and specialized
use in Black Sea trade, comic references suggest that foreign small silver change
also circulated in the Athenian agora.36 High exchange rates, low intensity
enforcement, a shortage of Athenian small change, and a general willingness on the
part of merchants to accept foreign coins (at a discount), could all have encouraged
some degree of circulation. From this circulation pool, foreign coins could enter the
public finance system through confiscations, dedications, and tax payments.37
However trifling this amount may have been, the hundreds of talents of tribute
arriving in Athens every year likely included a considerable amount of foreign
coinage, both silver and electrum. It is far from certain that the Athenians routinely
demanded tribute payments in owls, or if they did, how successfully the allies were
able to adhere to Athenian wishes.38 The fact that tribute was collected over the
course of several generations also makes it highly unlikely that one policy was in
force continuously, or could be maintained under the best of circumstances.
Although the Athenians may have preferred to receive tribute in their own coinage,
Kallias Decree A (IG I3 52A) implies that the Hellenotamiai in the late 430s already
held mixed stores of coins, as other treasuries did shortly before Athens fell in
significance of money supply in relationship to prices, but this was not something that coin-issuing
governments tried to regulate, as is the case today.
35 A fourth-century inscription from Olbia (S/G3 218), for example, announces that only Olbian
coinage is to be used within the polis and sets exchange rates for various types of foreign coinage.
In Athens, Nikophon's nomos of 375/4 (SEG 26.72) stipulates that only non-imitative, non-counterfeit
owls, i.e., genuine owls, are legal tender.
36 A fishmonger in a play by Diphilus (4lh c; apud Athenaeus 6.225b), for example, takes heavier
Aeginetan obols as payment for a sea bass, and gives lighter Athenian obols as change.
37 The accounts of various treasuries attest that this was the case, e.g., IG I3 341.11, 342.9-10.
378.21, 24-25, etc.
38 Figueira (1998, 266-294) presents the most detailed analysis to date for the possibility of
payment of tribute in non-Attic coins.
HATCHING OWLS: ATHENIAN PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE REGULATION OF COIN PRODUCTION 141
404.39 Also, while the context of an annual payment to Athens would provide
sufficient time for the allies to collect or exchange other coins for owls throughout
the year, time was short when the Athenians came calling for supplementary
contributions.40 In this way still more mixed batches of coins were added to the
coffers, even if some of the foreign coins were spent along the way by Strategoi
in the field.41
Through the various tax and tribute revenue streams significant amounts of
foreign coinage could thus enter the finance system at points upstream from the
mint. While there was tolerance for leaving these coins unmolested, as Kallias A
shows, there may have been occasional reasons to convert this silver into owls
triggered by the types of internal budgeting mechanisms discussed above. In these
types of internal operations, in which the mint converted silver already in the
system into owls, the mint was simply providing a service to other departments
without necessarily adding value to the resulting owls since the production costs
associated with the minting would have to be absorbed by the system as a whole.
Indeed, recognition of these added costs (rather than added value) may have
discouraged the various treasuries from a policy of continuously converting bullion
and foreign coinage in their stores into owls, but rather encouraged them to do so
only when necessary on an ad hoc basis. There were, of course, ways in which to
pass these costs on to the tax and tribute payers.
The polis could demand that all tax and tribute payments be made in owls, for
example. Those holding bullion or foreign coinage would thus have to purchase
owls in the market at a premium, or, if possible, approach the mint to sell their
silver at a discount (or placing it on deposit for conversion but for a fee, which
would amount to the same thing). The discount rate would cover the costs of
conversion and might also include a (small) profit - the mint's direct contribution
to generating revenue for the public finance system. Typically in antiquity sellers
could expect these combined brassage and seigniorage fees to be 3-5% of the
39 Line 4 of Kali ias A specifies that the 3000 talents transferred to the treasury of Athena is in "our
coinage" (nomismatos heinedapo) i.e., owls. The implication being, as Samons (2000, 119) puts it,
that there was «a large chest containing both Athenian and non-Athenian currency - the latter, one
imagines, in sufficient quantity to make the specific provisions to use Athenian coins for the transfer
to Athena necessary.» Cf. IG I3 378.22, for the use of the same phrase in an inscription that also lists
foreign coinage.
40 Throughout the Archidamian War, the Athenians send round argurologoi nees (e.g., Thuc.
3.19.1) either to enforce tribute collection, or to seek additional moneys on top of tribute. Kallet-
Marx (1993, 135, 163) supports the latter interpretation, characterizing the these vessels as simply
"money-collecting ships."
41 Mattingly (1996, 497-503) argues that the Jordan hoard (IGCH 1482) and the Decadrachm
hoard (CH 8.48), both containing mixed Athenian and non-Athenian issues, may represent tribute
collections that were passed on to Strategoi in the Field.
142
PETER G. VAN ALFEN
commodity value of their silver (cf. M0rkholm 1982,290-296), although the fees
could have been higher.42
The only direct evidence we possess, however, for these types of mechanisms
and fees in later fifth century Athens is from the notoriously problematic Standards
Decree (7G I3 1453), enforcing the exclusive use of Athenian owls within the arche
and providing for the conversion of all other circulating silver into owls.43 Section
V of the Decree, unfortunately incomplete, possibly mentions the coining of around
half of the mint's reserve stock of silver in order to pay out (fresh) owls to the allies
when they first come to exchange their silver at the mint, and possibly sets the fee
for this service at either 3 or 5%.44 Nothing about this Section, or the Decree in
general is uncontested. Furthermore, we cannot be certain that these mechanisms
and fees were common outside of the context of the Decree, or that the motivation
to provide outsiders access to the mint, if this was not common, was ultimately
intended to increase fiscal efficiency while lowering internal costs, to raise revenue
through forced conversions, or to reinforce political and economic hegemony.
Whatever the motivation, it was complicated by any number of political, economic,
and social factors.
Unfortunately, as we have seen, we do not posses good evidence for
determining both the rate of converting non-Athenian silver to owls and the
mechanisms by which this would have occurred. But if free minting was a
mechanism, we can see how providing unrestricted access to the mint for all
comers with silver would be qualitatively different from the types of complicated
42 Depending on the demand for owls, the mint might well have adjusted its fees to reflect market
rates for owls (i.e., agio) at the exchange tables, unless these rates were already fixed by the polis (as
they were at Olbia, see n.36), or the exchange tables followed the mint trying to undercut its rates.
Fixed or not, the Kolakretai levied a tax on the agio indicating that the polis kept close tabs on the
tables' activities anyway (Arist. Wasps 788b, cf. 787a-c). Demand for owls must have been constantly
high with tribute paying states, traders, and hoarders competing against one another to obtain them.
43 The literature on the Decree is vast. For our purposes, Figuiera (1998,353-363), who dates the
Decree to the 440s BC, provides a reconstruction of Section V, arguing that the mint was to coin no
less than half of its reserve stock; the 3% minting fee was borne not by the allies, but the Athenians.
Figueira's treatment of the Decree, although comprehensive, has not won universal support; see, for
example, Kallet (2001, 205-226), who dates the Decree to c. 414. Although Kallet does not discuss
the minting fee per se, the notion that the mint (or public finance system) would seek to profit from
the recoining of silver in the arche by charging even 5%, would sit well with her arguments for the
purpose of the Decree being to generate more revenue in a heavy-handed fashion.
44 Indirect evidence for a 5% fee used to be found in the bistathmic market and silver mina
(105:100) attributed to Solon (Ath. Pol. 10.2). However, the Parthenon ingots of 344 BC (see n. 21
above) prove that the precious metal or silver mina was used for uncoined as well as coined silver
since their weights are clearly expressed in the precious metal system of 100 drachmas = 1 mina. As
Kroll (2001,89 n. 9) also notes, because the silver mina was used to weight coin, bullion, and objets
d'art it therefore could not be the basis for profit making at the mint. Figueira (1998, 244) suggests
that the stathmic difference provided a cushion for administrative and technical difficulties while
mint fees were something wholly separate.
HATCHING OWLS: ATHENIAN PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE REGULATION OF COIN PRODUCTION ] 43
political and other motivations surrounding access to the mint found in the
Standards Decree. With free minting the motivation would simply be the polis's
desire to reap profits from the conversion. The question of free minting in Athens
is important not only because of the substantial (putative) volume of privately held
foreign silver entering Athens needing to be exchanged or converted, but even
more so because a large proportion of the silver produced at the Laureion mines
appears to have ended up in private hands. What, then, were the mechanisms for
turning Laureion silver into owls?
Laureion Silver
Most of our evidence for mining operations and administration comes from c.
370-330 BC, especially the 340s, a period when the Athenians were seriously
revising their public finance system and searching for creative measures to cut
costs and generate new revenues,45 similar in some respects to Xenophon's
suggestions in the Poroi written in the 350s. The evidence for the fifth century is
spotty, and for the archaic period virtually non existent. The assumption made here,
as in most other studies, is that mining operations and administration in the fifth
century were generally similar to those of the fourth.
The Athenian demos owned the silver resources of Attika even when found on
private property.46 Mining operations, however, were almost exclusively privately
run enterprises. Individuals or consortia of individuals bid for leases to work mines
offered by the Poletai; the winners were vetted by the Boule, presumably to ensure
their integrity and ability to uphold what was effectively an important state contract
(AP 47.2; Rhodes 1972,97). Various fixed and recurring fees appear to have been
associated with the leases including state taxes and rents paid to land owners; it is
also possible that the state took some additional proportion of the silver produced
by the leasees, although there is no evidence for this practice or the amount;47 many
45 For an overview of these changes with particular reference to the mines see Faraguna (1992, chp.
5). See also Kroll (forthcoming) for the initiation of the production of pi-style owls as a component
part of revenue generating ploys in the 350s.
46 Thiir (2002) and Samons (2000,203-4) offer thoughts on how these resources might have come
into public ownership, including a nascent theory of eminent domain or Bergregal. The literature on
the mines is extensive. Much of the following is based on Conophagos (1980) and Rihill (2001) for
technical aspects of mining and smelting; Osborne (1985), Shipton (2000) and Christesen (2003) for
socio-economic aspects; Faraguna (1992; 2006), Apergis (1997-1998), Shipton (1998), and
MacDowell (2006) for problems in administration.
47 The Suda (s.v. agrapou metallou dike) states that there was a tax of 1/24 (4.125%) associated
with the mines; there is, however, no consensus about where in the leasing or mining process this tax
was applied or its date. Scholars generally agree though that this rate is too small to represent the
state's entire take: Aperghis 1997-1998,18-19; Figueira 1998, 184-185; Samons 2000, 203, n.153;
Faraguna 2006, 150; Thiir 2006. Based on SEG 10.87, Mattingly (1996, 238-242) argues that the
144
PETER G. VAN ALFEN
scholars have insisted that the proportion of additional fresh silver retained by the
state was high.48 The entire process of mining and smelting required a tremendous
amount of labor; many miserable man-hours of work were required to extract and
smelt the 16 kg of ore needed to produce a drachma's worth (c. 4 g) of finished
silver (cf. Rihill 2001,115). While there are accounts of poorer citizens physically
engaged in mining operations, some of whom found a modicum of wealth in the
process (cf. Dem. 42.20), most of the hard work of mining and smelting was done
by slaves.49 Mining "companies" could thus vary in size from a single man (and
his slave) to hundreds, even thousands, of slaves owned by a single man or
consortium.
Making money in the mines was largely a matter of luck and minimizing costs
and risk. Some years undoubtedly were better than others; some mines more
productive. It has been estimated that the Laureion mining industry at the height
of its productivity could yield over 700, perhaps even 1000 talents of fresh silver
per year, a prodigious amount that roughly equaled the revenues derived from the
rest of the empire in good years. 50 Nevertheless, there were, as Flament (2007a,4-
5) demonstrates, considerable overhead costs in addition to taxes and rents: the
purchase (or lease) and upkeep of slaves, tools, mine supports, lamps, etc. Investors
in the mines, like those in equally risky seafaring ventures with their potentially
high returns (up to 50%: Christesen 2003, 52), could minimize their risks by
entering into multilateral partnerships (cf. Dem. 37) to spread the costs of
dekate (10% tax) mentioned in line 7 of Kallias Decree A (IG I3 52A) was a tax on Laureion
production. The state might have gotten revenue from smelting furnaces, perhaps as a tax, cf. Thiir
2006, 164, who suggests the Suda's 4.125% was this tax; also cf. Xen. Poroi 4.49. Fresh Laureion
silver could also have entered the system through mines owned by sanctuaries or as ritual levies; for
the 4!h c. "Hephaistiakon" as a mine see Langdon 1991,91; as a levy see Samons 2000,31; Figueira
1998,370-371; Faraguna 2006.154-155. Also note that moneys apparently from Laureion appear in
the Parthenon and Propylaia building accounts, e.g., 1G P 465.126; 444.249; cf. 445.294,464.103.
48 Aperghis (1997-1998, 18-19) argues for a rate of 10%, which Faraguna (2006, 150) sees as a
minimum suggesting it was much more onerous; Figueira (1998, 184-5) notes the figure of 75-100
talents «was a likely minimum for state income from all taxes that drew (even indirectly) from mine
output» based on an estimated annual produce from the mines of over 700 talents; i.e., 10-15%;
Flament (2007a and 2007b, 31) posits 20%, while Thiir (2006) suggest up to 50%. Samons (2000,
204) argues that «the disparate evidence can be reconciled by a system that combines a fixed (and
very large) percentage of the miner's produce accruing to the state and the sale at auction (AP 47.2)
of the right to work the mines (on the agreement of surrendering this percentage).* Just how large
this percentage may have been, he does not venture to say.
49 The 20,000 slaves that Thucydides (7.27-28) says deserted Attika during the Dekeleian War are
generally assumed to have been mine laborers. Hanson (1992) argues that many were engaged in
other activities.
50 Conopahgos (1980, 138-152; 341-354) estimated that at the high point of fifth century
production the mines were producing 20 metric tons (736 talents) of silver per year; Flament (2007a,
5) pushes this estimate closer to 1000 talents based on calculations of maintaining the slave
population.
r
j
f- ;
HATCHING OWLS: ATHENIAN PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE REGULATION OF COIN PRODUCTION 145
extraction, and by concurrently investing either individually or in partnerships in
lower risk smelting operations and slave leasing.5' Once overhead costs, taxes,
and rents had been settled, successful investors could then expect to receive their
portion of the profits in the form of silver ingots.
There is no indication that the Athenians set restrictions on how this privately
held bullion could be disposed. Presumably any portion of this that was not
immobilized for wealth storage or dedication to the gods was sold as commodity
silver to the highest bidder, whether local metalworkers, procurement agents for
foreign mints, or others (Figueira 1998,184-185; cf. Xen. Poroi 3.2). Demand for
bullion may have fluctuated depending on factors like the sailing season for trade
or the build up to war allowing for wide (annual) variability in prices and for
speculation. Market forces therefore may have played an important role in
decisions regarding the fate of the bullion, including the possibility that bullion
could be used to buy other commodities, like shipments of wine or oil, without
first being converted to coinage.
Conversely, Flament (2007a) has recently proposed that most of this privately
held bullion - up to 80% of the annual total production - was immediately
monetized at the Athenian mint. The massive striking of later fifth century owls,
he argues, was due to Laureion producers needing their bullion to be converted as
rapidly as possible so they might pay their debts. Following Shipton (2000), he
notes that many of the Laureion producers were wealthy elites carrying significant
overheads in their mining operations, and were also liable for expensive liturgies.
The state made concessions to the needs of this private economy by allowing easy
access to the mint for silver conversion at cost (brassage only, not seigniorage); in
other words, the Athenians allowed reduced rate free minting for tetradrachms,
presumably as a common good. If Flament is correct, Athens would be exceptional
in this as well; de Callatay's (2005) search for free minting in antiquity turned up
negative results. It would also be exceedingly generous of the Athenians to forgo
any potential profits on a comparatively easily produced trade coinage that was in
high demand at home and overseas.
Flament's arguments may be correct in so far as a tremendous amount of
privately held bullion was converted into owls in later fifth century Athens, but
the mechanisms by which this happened require further comment and nuance.52 As
51 Osborne (1985, chp. 6), Christesen (2003), and Faraguna (2006) explore these and other
strategies for minimizing risk.
52 We might also wonder at some of the additional social and economic implications of his
"politique monetaire." If, as Flament implies, free minting and the subsequent loss of revenue to the
polis from seigniorage was justified in part by the elites' need to have coinage to pay for liturgies,
how would this square with rampant elite liturgy avoidance (Christ 1990; 2006, chp. 4) and their
own version of tax-free, offshore bank accounts (Cohen 2005)?
146
PETER G. VAN ALFEN
an alternative to Flament's view, one that is more consistent with the character of
the public finance system presented above, and that incorporates a healthy market
for bullion, we should expect that all the actors were working according to their
best financial interest, not just Athenian elites (cf. Christesen 2003). In terms of the
public finance system, we should expect mechanisms to develop that favored the
system first, while not wholly disallowing private interests.53 One such mechanism
might be that the state purchased Laureion bullion in addition to collecting taxes
on it.54 Whatever the cumulative total of the direct taxes the state demanded on
Laureion silver production (see n. 48) - let us say the state took 10% - it was
immediately in a favorable position to purchase the remaining 90% of the silver at
what was effectively a substantial discount, i.e., 10%, even if it paid full market
rates. If simultaneously the mint charged any fees, brassage or seigniorage or both,
to convert privately held silver into coinage, it was in the producers best interest,
if they intended to obtain owls with their bullion, to sell bullion to the state when
they paid their taxes rather than retain it and pay an additional tax (i.e., minting
fees) on the silver at a later date. By purchasing large amounts of bullion at its
effective discount rate, the state was also in a position to produce large amounts of
coinage at a substantial profit even if it had to absorb the production costs of the
coinage (i.e., 10% discount rate - 2% production costs = 8% profit). Private
producers would still have the option of selling their silver elsewhere, if they could
find a better price, which would be unlikely since the state had considerable
headroom within which to up its prices. The total effect would essentially be the
same as Flament's - the Laureion bullion holders could still be pushing huge
quantities of silver into the system and receiving owls in return - but for one crucial
difference: the initiative lay with the public economy, not the private, or at least was
shared between the two.
4. Conclusions
Although we await the die study of later fifth century owls to help us determine
the scale and rhythms of production, and additional metallurgical studies to divulge
the relative importance of the various revenues streams in the production of the
53 Similar means of achieving public and private interests simultaneously might be found in the
system of tax fanning, whereby the state maximized its returns through auction, while tax collectors
maximized theirs through their individual collecting techniques.
54 Faraguna (1992, 307) explores a number of mechanisms by which the state could obtain
privately held Laureion silver for striking owls, including the purchase of bullion with owls. In this
scenario, however, any profit accrued by the state was a factor of the bistathmic weight system (see
n. 45 above).
HATCHING OWLS: ATHENIAN PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE REGULATION OF COIN PRODUCTION \ 47
owls, we can nevertheless make headway on questions pertaining to Athenian
public finance and the regulation of coin production. By a close examination of the
mint's role within the Athenian public finance system, we should expect to find
mechanisms that had direct bearing on the number of coins the Athenians produced.
However, because of the inherent flexibility and adaptability of the system we
should also not expect to find a single policy or mechanism determining outputs
that was in place continuously throughout the period in question. For this reason,
we cannot say that there was one universal policy guiding coin production, and
thereby quantities, that was applicable to all situations. Instead, we should expect
that varying degrees of oversight were exercised depending on internal
administrative needs and external exigencies.
In terms of the regulation of silver inputs, the state's interest in generating
revenue, including that from the Laureion mines or minting fees, would most likely
lead it to adopt policies that were fiscally self-serving. Incentives to reward private
efforts in aiding the state, e.g., private profit from mining operations, should not
distract us from the priority placed on the public economy over the private.
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